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Guns, Gays, and Ganja
Justin R. Long-
I. INTRODUCTION
In this brief essay, I consider three law-reform
movements that have treated state constitutional change as
a tool for advancing their national policy aims. The
movements for gun deregulation, marriage equality, and
marijuana legalization each provide a concrete case study
for how state constitutional change fits in with American
federalism and constitutional change at the national level.
Others before me, particularly my symposium co-
panelist Dean James Gardner, have offered deep and broad
theoretical analysis of the interaction between state and
federal constitutionalism.' I do not attempt such a
magisterial approach here. Instead, I highlight comparative
features of these three movements to reveal some counter-
intuitive insights about how state constitutions relate to
national legal change. Advocates in each of these areas have
been able to use federalism as a tool to build "facts on the
ground," literal spaces where their preferred policies are
carried out.2 Although these changes occur state by state
and are often framed as the exercise of state sovereignty,
their ultimate goal is always to influence national policy by
demonstrating that their policies (once actually in place
somewhere) are not scary. The three movements I will
review here vary in interesting ways with respect to their
. Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. I thank the editors of the Arkansas
Law Review for their outstanding symposium and their generous and patient
contributions to this essay.
1. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005).
2. Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 284
(James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014).
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use of state constitutional discourse. And the influence these
state constitutional reforms have had on national policy has
similarly varied.
To frame this inquiry, I focus on two themes. First, the
theme of interactive federalism runs throughout these three
movements. Interactive federalism, as I use the phrase here,
is the perpetual dialogue between state and federal policies
as each layer of government seeks to advance the interests
of its own constituency.3 The legal pluralism established by
our federal system permits advocates to pursue (and
achieve) change in states, even where federal policy appears
firmly established.4 While the capacity of states to protect
individual rights above the federal floor is not novel, or even
all that controversial, a common theme of these three law-
reform movements is that even where federal law is in direct
conflict with state policy, advocates have found success
carving out safe legal space for their federally disfavored
agendas. In other words, despite the formal supremacy of all
federal law, states have been able to maintain legal regimes
as a matter of practice that are legally irreconcilable with
federal policy.5 The marijuana legalization movement offers
the most vivid example of this practice.
Second, the theme of rights helps understand how these
three movements have used legal and rhetorical strategies to
advance their ultimate policy preferences. Rights language
rests on non-utilitarian grounds, which therefore is
commonly anti-majoritarian. 6  In law, this rhetoric
frequently gets translated as constitutional. In contrast,
policy arguments emphasize social. utility as a primary
rationale. Such arguments appeal explicitly to the common
good, and in that sense are inherently majoritarian. In law,
this rhetoric tends to play out as legislative reform. Each of
the three movements I discuss in this essay shows complex
3. See Robert A. Schapiro, justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2135 (2006).
4. See id. at 2157.
5. Seeid.at2142.
6. David A. Sklansky, Private Policing and Human Rights, 5 LAw & ETHIcs HUM.
RTS. 112, 124 (2011); see also David E. Guinn, Constitutional Intent and Interpretation:
A Response to Black's View of Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 225, 241
(2001).
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movement over time and geography between rights and
policy arguments, between constitutional and legislative law.
The availability of state constitutions, specifically as
constitutions, provides an extraordinary law space where
rights-based arguments can find a foothold.
In the context of state constitutional change, then, the
three law-reform movements-gun deregulation, marriage
equality, and marijuana legalization-together demonstrate
the importance of state constitutions as sources of energy
for national change. State constitutions work in perpetual
dialogue with federal law, pricking and prodding to find and
exploit opportunities for change. Interactive federalism is,
descriptively, a constant and deep-rooted aspect of
American law. But it is not merely the existence of legal
pluralism via states that generates these opportunities. The
rights-based, potentially anti-majoritarian aspect of state
constitutions expands the rhetorical strategies available to
law-reform advocates and can further catalyze change at the
national level.
The federal Constitution is, now, famously unamendable
by formal means.7 One might lament this development as
steeling the cold grip of the dead hand, a calcification of the
hold long-ago generations maintain on our contemporary
community. But state constitutions breathe a revitalizing air
into the body politic, an air capable of softening the rigid
strictures of the Plan of the Convention. Viewed in this way,
state constitutions are far from the constitutional margins
that scholars and lawyers often consign them to. Rather,
state constitutions are a central and necessary lever that
keeps American constitutionalism alive.
I proceed with exploring these two themes of
interactive federalism and rights rhetoric by reviewing the
modern movement for gun deregulation in Part II. Then, in
Part III, I discuss those parts of the movement for same-sex
7. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (arguing that the federal Constitution has become static
and is politically unalterable); see also Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in
Constitutional Amendment, 69 ARK. L. REV. 217, 221 (2016) (noting the political
impossibility of changing important parts of the text of the federal Constitution). Of
course, judicial interpretation continues to produce remarkable change in
constitutional meaning as a practical matter.
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marriage equality that touch on these themes. In Part IV, I
tell the story of the movement for marijuana legalization and
its use of state constitutionalism. Finally, I conclude with
comments on what we can learn from a comparison of these
three movements.
II. GUNS
The first state constitutions in the late eighteenth
century and early nineteenth century did not all contain
clauses protecting the right to bear arms, but where they did,
they tended to be more explicitly protective of an
individual's right to bear arms than the federal Second
Amendment.8  Nevertheless, these clauses were rarely
litigated and courts often construed them narrowly to
permit legislatures to regulate guns fairly comprehensively.9
The state constitutional clauses tended not to present much
of an obstacle to the states' exercise of their broad police
powers to maintain public order and public safety.' 0
Protection of gun rights up through the nineteenth century
was essentially a non-issue; regulation was perceived to be
reasonable and there was little to no rights-based litigation
on the issue." Political compromises on regulation centered
on pragmatic and eminently utilitarian concerns, such as the
risk presented by hunting near population centers.1 2 The
federal Second Amendment did not apply to states,' 3 and so
states were free to pass gun regulation limited only by the
(largely unenforced) state constitutions.
However, with the rise of organized crime in response
to federal Prohibition and the ensuing growth in federal
criminal law along with the apparatus to enforce it, gun
8. E.g., MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 6 ("Every person has a right to keep and
bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.").
9. See ROBERT J. SPITZER, GUNS ACROSS AMERICA: RECONCILING GUN RULES AND RIGHTS
52 (2015) (collecting early states' pervasive regulation of guns in the name of public
safety); see also Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159 (1840) (upholding gun
regulation in the face of a state constitutional clause protecting the right to bear
arms).
10. SPITZER, supra note 9.
11. Id. at 52-56.
12. Id. at 52.
13. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
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regulation intensified at the national level. Congress passed
the National Firearms Act in 1934, imposing a
comprehensive regulatory system intended to remove guns
from gangsters and deter the use of weapons in the
commission of crimes by imposing federal taxes on firearms
and requiring federal registration of specified guns most
associated with criminality.1 4 After the U.S. Supreme Court
gave Congress wide berth to continue gun regulation by
upholding the National Firearms Act,15 advocates for gun
rights made only sporadic attempts to litigate state
constitutional claims-presumably on the assumption that
the federal government was willing to enforce its criminal
law, rendering state efforts to protect rights above the
federal "ceiling" ineffectual.1 6  Meanwhile, Congress
continued to pass further restrictions on firearms.' 7
The federal push toward greater gun regulation was
eventually matched by the states. Despite the fact that only
six states lack a state constitutional clause explicitly
protecting gun rights,18 neither state nor federal courts
aggressively enforced these clauses through the twentieth
century. In perhaps the most typical state constitutional
decision on the right to bear arms, the Illinois Supreme
Court held in 1984 that a municipality could effectively
prohibit handguns, despite the state constitutional clause
protecting an individual right to bear arms.' 9
14. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938)
(repealed 1968); see also National Firearms Act, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-
regulations/national-firearms-act [https://perma.cc/4WFZ-DY7S] (last visited Mar.
16, 2016).
15. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
16. SPITZER, supra note 9. For example, the National Rifle Association, although
formed shortly after the Civil War, did not systematically encourage members to
oppose gun regulation until 1934 and did not begin lobbying on its own until 1975.
See A Brief History of the NRA, NRA, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra
[https://perma.cc/C8ER-TMJZ] (last visited July 29, 2016).
17. 52 Stat. 1250 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-910) (establishing
licensing and registration requirements); repealed by Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-28 (2015))
(limiting the possession of certain weapons).
18. Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 191, 193-204 (2006).
19. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 277 (Ill. 1984).
2016] 457
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Faced with limited prospects in the courts, gun
advocates turned to legislation. In doing so, they adopted
two important strategies, consistently with the two themes
of this essay. They shifted rhetoric from rights-based
arguments to policy arguments, and they developed strong
national organizations to advance their goals. The National
Rifle Association (NRA) began distributing advocacy
materials to its members contemporaneously with
Congress's turn toward greater regulation. 20 In 1975, the
NRA stepped up its advocacy activity with the formation of
its lobbying arm, the Institute for Legislative Action.21 Since
1934, the NRA has consistently been involved in fighting gun
regulations at both the state and federal levels, reflecting the
importance of state-level legislation in both criminal and
administrative law.22
Rhetorically, for much of the late nineteenth and early-
to mid-twentieth centuries (a time when the courts were
largely closed to gun-rights arguments), 23 gun advocates
presented their position as sound policy. Advocates
highlighted the "traditional" and ordinary uses of firearms,
including for hunting and target shooting, alongside
arguments about self-defense rights.24 These arguments'
efficacy rested on their reasonableness to political
majorities; they are framed as consistent with, and even
supportive of, state power and majoritarian rule. 2 5
By the first years of the current century, more radical
arguments began to dominate over the accommodationist
and instrumentalist arguments that had persuaded state
legislatures to adopt statutes protecting gun ownership and
use.26 Advocates' language about self-defense grew deeper,
positioning self-defense as essentially a right of natural law
20. See A Brief History of the NRA, supra note 16.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
24. ADAM WINKLER, GUN FIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 207-08 (2013).
25. See id. (describing the efforts of the U.S. Revolver Association, a pro-gun
group, to promote gun safety regulation).
26. See JOSHUA HORWITZ & CASEY ANDERSON, GUNS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
INSURRECTIONIST IDEA 13-15 (2009) (describing the rhetorical shift to an emphasis on
gun rights as a right against the government rather than a right against crime).
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inherent in human dignity more than as a practical device in
circumstances where crime is high and police are few. 27 And
even beyond self-defense as an individual right to protect
oneself from crime, pro-gun rhetoric drew in from the
margins ideas about gun rights as collective self-defense
from an oppressive government-guns as the necessary
tools of popular resistance to federal authority.28
Finally, after centuries of supporting gun regulation, in
2008 the Supreme Court adopted the rights-based
arguments and held that the federal Second Amendment
protects an individual right to possess firearms.29 In that
case, District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia, a devoted
hunter writing for the Court, cited early state constitutions
(but not their permissive modern interpretations) as legal
context for his interpretation of the Second Amendment.30
He described Second Amendment rights in almost natural-
law terms, without relying on conclusions about optimal
public policy or utilitarian advantages of widespread gun
ownership. 31  Framing the matter as one of counter-
majoritarian rights was crucial to the plaintiffs' victory, as
reflected by the Court's language in the majority opinion.32
For example, the Court approvingly quoted Cruikshank's
declaration33 that the Second Amendment protected, but did
not grant, the right to bear arms, and went on to note,
"Under the auspices of the 1671 Game Act, for example, the
Catholic Charles II had ordered general disarmaments of
regions home to his Protestant enemies. These experiences
caused Englishmen to be extremely wary of concentrated
27. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 90-94
(2014) (explaining the NRA's shift from a mostly pro-hunting group to a gun-rights
group).
28. See, e.g., Mike McPhate, Michele Fiore, A Nevada Assemblywoman, Finds
Unlikely Role at Oregon Standoffs End, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/us/michele-fiore-returns-to-spotlight-
during-oregon-standoff.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K33H-N7DW] (reporting on a
gun-rights advocate's description of guns as protection from federal infringement of
popular liberty).
29. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008).
30. Id. at 601-03.
31. See id. at 570.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
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military forces run by the state and to be jealous of their
arms." 3 4 The Court went on to describe King George III's
efforts to "disarm" the colonists as a motivating force behind
the new Americans' devotion to the right to bear arms-a
"protect[ion] against both public [meaning governmental]
and private violence."35
Just two years later, in McDonald v. Chicago, the Court
again invalidated a local ordinance that restricted
possession of handguns, this time holding that the Second
Amendment was incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment like most of the other protections
established by the Bill of Rights. 36  Again, the Court's
language reflected a philosophy of gun rights as not
dependent on social welfare but a deeply ingrained feature
of autonomous citizens. 37 The Court did not shy from the
implication that gun rights exist in part to protect citizens
from their government, although the Court never drew this
idea to its logical conclusion that gun-bearing citizens might
have a right to use force against federal officials if those
officials disrespect constitutional liberties.38 The natural-
law rhetoric appeared again most recently in Judge Manion's
dissent in the Seventh Circuit case of Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, which upheld broad restrictions on certain
kinds of guns.3 9 Judge Manion read Heller and McDonald as
expressly resting gun rights on natural-law grounds.40
In sum, advocates for protecting gun ownership shifted
their rhetoric from policy-based majoritarian arguments to
natural-law type rights arguments, and in doing so
persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court to reach an expansive
view of the Second Amendment. They did so with the
interpretive help of early state constitutions, but without
having built state constitutional protections for guns across
a substantial number of states or a broad track record of
judicial opinions adopting their positions. Instead, the states
34. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.
35. Id. at 594.
36. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
37. See id. at 767-70.
38. See id.
39. 784 F.3d 406, 412-14 (7th Cir. 2015) (Manion, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 414.
460
GUNS, GAYS, AND GANJA
have been following the federal lead, in a pattern familiar to
scholars of state constitutional rights' interpretation. 41
Ill. GAYS
In the mid-twentieth century, enforcement of anti-gay
sodomy laws was pervasive at the federal, state, and local
levels.42 Criminal enforcement in this era commonly took
the form of "vice" raids on bars or clubs known to be popular
with gay men.4 3 The politicians and police would use the
stigma and publicity of arrest to shame, punish, and exploit
gay men and lesbians.44 This would distract the public from
official corruption, disrupt political opponents, and generally
foster a sense of revulsion at non-conformity. 45
Then, in 1969, a New York police raid on the Stonewall
Inn yielded unexpected results. Instead of accepting their
subjugation, the men inside resisted the police, leading to
what is often characterized as a "riot."46 The incident served
as a spark that galvanized a nascent gay-rights movement.47
Marriage equality rose to a prominent place on the new
movement's agenda almost immediately.48 These first suits
were brought under the federal Constitution, but lacked both
the support of national organizations and anything close to
popular acceptance. 49 They were unceremoniously rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 by a curt statement that
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal "for want of a
substantial federal question."50
Even more than marriage equality, however, the gay-
rights movement after Stonewall was understandably
41. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Evans, 327 P.3d 1303, 1309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014)
(holding that the Washington constitution protects an individual right to bear arms
when used for self-defense).
42. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 3-5 (2013).
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 4-5.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id. at 16-17.
47. KLARMAN, supra note 42, at 17.
48. Id. at 18-20.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), cert denied, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
2016] 461
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focused on decriminalization. 5 Anti-sodomy statutes, even
when rarely enforced, stood as a practical and symbolic
obstacle to the establishment of a non-discrimination
norm. 52 Private employers and the government could point
to the criminal codes as justification for all sorts of other
anti-gay discrimination.53 During this period, there was
virtually no state constitutional litigation, but for the notable
exception of Kentucky v. Wasson, where the Kentucky
Supreme Court invalidated the state's anti-sodomy statute
on state constitutional privacy grounds. 54 Despite the lack of
success with constitutional arguments of both state and
federal varieties, advocates kept their rhetoric squarely
framed as a matter of rights, not utilitarian public policy.55
Eventually, state constitutional courts began giving
marriage equality advocates the victories they had hoped
for, starting with the tentative step of applying a heightened
standard of review, 56 through to civil unions, 57 and finally all
the way to marriage.58  National organizations were
instrumental in putting legal teams together, composing
strategies, and financing the state-by-state litigation
campaigns.59 While the state high courts that affirmed
marriage equality as a matter of constitutional rights
certainly inspired backlash-from federal lawmakers
through the Defense of Marriage Act60 and from state
lawmakers and voters through state constitutional
amendments limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples or
otherwise allowing for sexual orientation discrimination 6 1-
advocates also used the courtroom victories to create
51. See Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1065, 1073-
74 (2005).
52. See id. at 1087.
53. See id at 1086.
54. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Ky. 1992).
55. See id at 516-17.
56. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65, 67 (Haw. 1993).
57. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
58. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
59. See MARC SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How SAME-SEX
COUPLES TOOK ON THE POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS-AND WON 224-33 (2014).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
61. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) (invalidating a state
constitutional amendment that protected discrimination against gays and lesbians).
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momentum that led to political victories. Both state
legislative enactments and popular initiatives were passed
to provide marriage equality, again with national
coordination among a variety of national advocacy groups,
law firms, and lobbyists. 62  Throughout these political
successes, though, advocates consistently positioned their
claims as about rights.63 Polling numbers began to favor the
movement, which helped persuade elected officials, but
advocates continued to press the idea that marriage equality
should be adopted for no reason other than its inherent
justice.64
In the same year that the Massachusetts high court
found a right to marriage equality in its state constitution,65
the U.S. Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, finally
eliminated the criminalization of homosexual conduct,
reversing a nearly twenty-year old precedent. 66 The holding
in Lawrence not only formally ended the official legal
opprobrium criminalization had conveyed, it expressed a
sense of the importance of gay men and lesbians to the
American experience that provided a cultural context for
further development of civil rights in this area. The Court
embraced this development in United States v. Windsor,
which invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act's clause
prohibiting the federal government from recognizing same-
sex marriages.67  One by one, and then all in a rush,
movement advocates turned back to the federal courts that
had so thoroughly rejected their claims decades earlier.68
Applying the logic of Lawrence and particularly Windsor,
district court after district court invalidated state marriage
statutes or constitutional clauses on federal constitutional
grounds; for some time it seemed as if the Supreme Court
would not need to take up the issue quickly because the
62. See SOLOMON, supra note 59, at 262-64.
63. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-50.
64. See SOLOMON, supra note 59, at 175-77.
65. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
66. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
67. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
68. Zoe Tillman, Same-Sex Union Foes to Pay Up, NAT'L L.J. (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202747728971/SameSex-Union-Foes-To-
Pay-Up?slreturn=201602 17154504 [https://perma.cc/39GG-T428].
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circuit courts were undivided.69 But when the Sixth Circuit
rejected a set of challenges to the discriminatory marriage
statutes and constitutional amendments in Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, 70 the Supreme Court had
little choice but to act. The result was the culmination of
nearly fifty years of painstaking work: the nationwide
establishment of marriage equality.7 1
IV. GANJA
Marijuana made its first inroads in American culture
after the Pancho Villa conflict, which resulted in a highly
porous border between Mexico and the American
Southwest.72  Shortly after the drug's introduction to
American culture, Prohibition diverted many consumers
from alcohol to marijuana.73  In the following decades
through the 1940s, marijuana also entered the United States
with Caribbean immigrants, particularly through New
Orleans. 74  Both patterns of marijuana importation
associated the people who primarily supplied and used
marijuana-Mexican immigrants and black Southerners
linked to jazz-with the drug itself.7 5 As a way of expressing
racist revulsion at these minority cultures, American
nativists began an anti-vice campaign with marijuana as its
major target.76  These anti-vice crusaders succeeded in
obtaining the nation's first harsh criminal penalties for
marijuana sale and use.77 Once marijuana was criminalized,
69. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Doug
Mataconis, justice Ginsburg Lifts Curtain on How Supreme Court Might View Same-Sex
Marriage, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR (Sept 20, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com
/layout/set/print/USA/Politics/Politics-Voices/2014/0920/Justice-Ginsburg-lifts-
curtain-on-how-Supreme-Court-might-view-same-sex-marriage [https://perma.cc/6
5QM-BSE3] (quoting Justice Ginsburg as suggesting that the Supreme Court might not
grant certiorari until opinions of federal appellate courts split on marriage equality).
70. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
72. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND
PROHIBITION POLITICs 2-3 (2004).
73. See id at 3.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 2-3.
76. See id at 3.
77. See GERBER, supra note 72, at 3.
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federal, state, and local officials could use the anti-vice
statutes to raid Chicano and African-American gathering
places, imprison those communities' leaders, and spread a
sense of fear and insecurity to society at large.78 While
native-born whites clearly used marijuana during these
early decades, the drug was so closely connected with racial
minorities in the popular mind that its criminalization did
not provoke wide-scale backlash among white voters or
politicians.79 On the contrary, stories of raids and arrests
served to validate sentiments of white superiority and
further divide ordinary white Americans from racially
marginalized groups.80
Later, in the 1960s, white anti-establishment
"counterculture" took root, most influentially in colleges.81
For young adults resisting the suffocating conformity of
post-World War II America, marijuana offered a useful
cultural weapon. Marijuana stood as a symbol of the
marginalized communities that had withstood such harsh
suppression before the war, and its use by white collegians
expressed at least an aesthetic declaration of independence
from their parents' whitebread norms.8 2 Marijuana also
provided a useful counterpoint to the alcohol use of the
older generation. As marijuana's cultural connotations
shifted from the preferred drug of southern minorities to the
preferred drug of middle-class white college students, harsh
anti-marijuana criminal enforcement began to fade.83
Then, with Reagan's sweep to power and the "Just Say
No" campaign, the backlash swung into gear. 84 The 1980s
war on drugs renewed lengthy prison sentences and
vigorous prosecution for marijuana users, and again tied
marijuana use to moral vice.85 The criminal justice system
was converted into an engine of moral purity, protecting
78. See id. at 4-9.
79. See id. at 8.
80. See id. at 14-15.
81. See id at 18.
82. See GERBER, supra note 72, at 19.
83. See id. at 18-20.
84. See id at 32-33.
85. See id at 32-33, 39-40.
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"good" Americans from the poor, racial minorities, and non-
conformists on campus.86
By the early 1990s, the pendulum seemed to swing in
the other direction. Advocates for decriminalization began
to talk about marijuana use in the context of bodily
autonomy and to link marijuana rhetorically with medical
rights like the right to refuse medical treatment and to
assisted suicide.87 The notion of "medical" marijuana spread
side-by-side with other priorities of the patient autonomy
movement. Why should legislators interfere in the
relationship between doctor and patient, advocates asked,
especially when the implicated behavior could not be shown
to harm others? Marijuana was typically described as
"natural" at a time when mainstream American society was
starting to question industrial consumer culture in food and
medicine.88 At the same time, cancer rates were high89 and
public health officials (along with attorneys general and
plaintiffs' lawyers) intensified their attacks on tobacco.90 In
contrast to the highly manipulated tobacco products sold by
opaque global corporations, marijuana decriminalization
advocates consistently presented this non-commercially
fabricated drug as an appropriate part of medical care.91
Public discourse about medical marijuana consistently
linked it with other health law advances like the
popularization of the right to have a healthcare proxy, the
right to make end-of-life decisions, and the right to refuse
medical treatment.92 These liberty-based arguments rarely
addressed instrumentalist public policy concerns like the
expense of prohibition enforcement. If the movement at that
time had a face, it would have been a cancer-stricken
86. See id, at 33.
87. See GERBER, supra note 72, at 91.
88. See, e.g., Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012)
(establishing the first nationwide standards for organic labeling).
89. See Sherri L. Stewart et al., Cancer Mortality Surveillance-United States,
1990-2000, CDC (June 4, 2004), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrh
tml/ss5303al.htm [https://perma.cc/4XSK-6NN8] (describing cancer as the second
leading cause of death in America during this decade).
90. See, e.g., Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995).
91. See GERBER, supra note 72, at 89.
92. See, e.g., Daniel J. Pfeifer, Note, Smoking Gun: The Moral and Legal Struggle
for Medical Marijuana, 27 TOURO L. REV. 339, 372 (2011).
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grandmother using marijuana brownies to fight the
nauseating effects of chemotherapy.
Advocates obtained small victories with this strategy as
early as 1975, winning the state constitutional case of Ravin
v. State on privacy grounds.93 The Alaska Supreme Court's
opinion in Ravin is rife with rights language and explicitly
calls on the libertarian heritage of Alaska as a ratio
decidendi.94 Litigation pressing state constitutional privacy
claims in other states never really gained popularity after
Ravin.95 Even so, legalization advocates were able to win
political victories for decades afterward with rights-based
arguments. For example, local laws protected medical
marijuana use in a few California municipalities starting in
1996.96 Unfortunately for their cause, Jack Kevorkian began
drawing national attention to his radical views on assisted
suicide.97 As Kevorkian went to more and more extreme
lengths to help patients die, the American public was
repulsed.98 Finally, in 1999, Kevorkian was found guilty of
second-degree murder for assisting a patient to die.99 His
flamboyant disregard for how culturally prepared
Americans were to tolerate assisted suicide led to a backlash
that largely stifled further advances for bodily autonomy in
the medical context. If medical marijuana remained in that
rhetorical frame, it would have been tainted by association
with Kevorkian's fringe beliefs.
Instead, advocates shifted their rhetorical strategy in
the early 2000s to one emphasizing the burden on the
taxpayer and the economy of marijuana criminalization.100
Instead of the medical bodily autonomy movement,
93. 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).
94. See id. at 503-04.
95. Jason Brandeis, The Continuing Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans Still Have a
Constitutional Right to Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes, 29 ALASKA L.
REv. 175, 175 (2012).
96. See GERBER, supra note 72, at 94-95.
97. See Keith Schneider, Dr. Jack Kevorkian Dies at 83; A Doctor Who Helped End
Lives, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevo
rkian.html?-r=0 [https://perma.cc/64VD-35UJ].
98. See id
99. See id
100. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Liberty Lost: The Moral Case for
Marijuana Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 279, 281 (2010).
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marijuana legalization began to be associated with the
movement against over-incarceration. 101 Advocates
highlighted the harsh penalties under state and federal law
for "mere" possession of relatively small amounts of
marijuana, and challenged the public and politicians to
consider whether the suppression of marijuana was worth
the costs of investigation, prosecution, incarceration, and the
subsequent legal impairment of people who otherwise may
be productive citizens.1 02
At the same time, legalization proponents continued to
press "medical" marijuana as the most politically palatable
reform. But instead of framing medical marijuana in
deontological libertarian terms as a matter of bodily
autonomy, discourse shifted to the efficacy of medical
marijuana. The question became not, "who are you to tell
me what I can do with my body," but "this is the only
medicine that helps me, and until there is an effective
alternative, who are you to tell my doctor what works for
me?" Along the same lines, advocates intensified their
comparison of relatively harmless marijuana with alcohol, a
much more socially devastating drug.103 As awareness of the
dangers of drunk driving and the public health consequences
of alcoholism expanded, legalization proponents consistently
emphasized the lack of such broad harms from marijuana.1 04
Nevertheless, attempts to win federal courts' support
for medical marijuana failed. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme
Court soundly rejected the possibility of a medical-necessity
defense to a federal marijuana prosecution in United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.105 A few years later,
the Court definitively rejected a Commerce Clause challenge
to the federal law criminalizing marijuana in Gonzales v.
Raich,106 and affirmed the supremacy of the Federal
101. See GERBER, supra note 72, 68-69.
102. See, e.g., Decriminalizing Pot Will Reduce Prison Population, Have No
Adverse Impact on Public Safety, Study Says, NORML (Nov. 21, 2007), http://norml.o
rg/news/2007/11/21/decriminalizing-pot-will-reduce-prison-population-have-no-
adverse-impact-on-public-safety-study-says [https://perma.cc/Z2MY-8XBD].
103. See GERBER, supra note 72, at 85-86.
104. See id. at 86.
105. 532 U.S. 483, 498-99 (2001).
106. 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).
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Controlled Substances Act (which placed marijuana in the
top tier of harmful drugs)1 07 against any state attempts to
protect marijuana use, like California's "Compassionate Use
Act." 08
In practice, states with permissive laws on medical
marijuana tended not to oversee marijuana prescriptions
with special rigor.' 09 California, in particular, was often
accused of permitting doctors to hand out medical-
marijuana patient cards for sham ailments like generalized
soft-tissue pain, headaches, or other subjective patient-
defined conditions.1 0 In effect, this approach seemed to be a
winking endorsement of recreational marijuana cloaked in
the benevolent white coat of medicine.
In the following decade, the wink became an open eye.
Marijuana reform proponents succeeded in obtaining
"decriminalization" of marijuana in several large
municipalities, including New York City."' Decriminaliza-
tion meant that police and prosecutors acknowledged that
marijuana possession remained a crime, but would
deliberately de-prioritize enforcement of those criminal
statutes below virtually all other law enforcement goals.
But advocates pushed further. National organizations
like NORML allied with in-state activists to achieve statewide
"legalization" of marijuana in Colorado, Oregon, and
107. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (2012).
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2016).
109. See Dylan Scott, Medical Marijuana: Do States Know How to Regulate It?,
GOVERNING (Aug. 2012), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-
medical-marijuana-becoming-mainstream.html [https://perma.cc/5484-DSSH].
110. See Lessley Anderson, Medical Marijuana, A Casual User's Tale, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/12/fashion/sundaystyles/
medical-marijuana-a-casual-users-tale.html??_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3GSR-67VK]
(describing one California marathon runner's marijuana prescription due to
migraines).
111. See Christopher Mathias, Ending New York City's Low-Level Marijuana
Arrests Doesn't Fix The Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:55 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpostcom/2014/11/10/new-york-city-marijuana-
arrests n_6136686.html [https://perma.cc/8FEK-ZBX8]; Transcript: Mayor de Blasio,
Police Commissioner Bratton Announce Change in Marijuana Policy, NYC (Nov. 10,
2014), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/511-14/transcript-mayor-d
e-blasio-police-commissioner-bratton-change-marijuana-policy [https://perma.cc/5V
BA-97TP].
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Washington.112 In these states, legalization means formal
legal immunity from prosecution for possession of
recreational amounts of marijuana.113 The turn to state
constitutions, interestingly, did not reflect a shift back
toward rights-rhetoric. Instead, proponents argued that
anti-marijuana laws made criminals of too many people, cost
the public treasury too much, resulted in racially disparate
law enforcement, and diverted law enforcement resources
from more important criminal justice goals.11 4 The use of
state constitutions to press these arguments, which
rhetorically fit more comfortably with policy-driven
legislative discourse than with constitutional anti-
majoritarian discourse, reflects broad public skepticism that
elected politicians are structurally capable of rational
legislation on this issue.115 Even with public support for
legalization expressed to pollsters, politicians still seem to
believe that they could too easily be painted as "soft on
crime," and with that would come an electoral price too
steep to pay.116 Instead of a quick soundbite demonizing
criminals, the argument for legalization seems to depend on
more nuanced public education that political campaigns for
state legislators are not well equipped to conduct.
On the other hand, the national movement-composed
of seasoned professionals and backed by substantial
112. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475B.010 (West
2016); H.I. 502, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012); Legalization, NORML,
http://norml.org/legalization [https://perma.cc/7SKN-JDBE] (last visited Mar. 16,
2016).
113. TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE LEGALIZATION OF
RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 n.4 (2014).
114. See The Editorial Board, Repeal Prohibition, Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-tim
e-marijuana-legalization.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/NAE8-8QMK]; see also Harry
Bradford, Marijuana Law Enforcement Cost States An Estimated $3.6 Billion in 2010:
ACLU, CNBC (June 5, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100791442
[https://perma.cc/FXP4-NTJK].
115. See David Jarman, When the Going Gets Tough, the Tough Go to the Initiative
Process, DAILY Kos ELECTIONS (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/st
ory/2014/11/23/1346449/-When-the-going-gets-tough-the-tough-go-to-the-
initiative-process [https://perma.cc/7NY-VLS3].
116. See Adam Nagourney, Despite Support in Party Democratic Governors Resist
Legalizing Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/04/06/us/politics/despite-support-in-party-democratic-governors-resist-legalizing-
marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/PV77-55NG].
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financial resources-succeeded in persuading the voters of
Colorado, Oregon, and Washington (and, to a lesser degree,
California) that the public's gut instinct to suppress crime
vigorously could be outweighed by the social and economic
advantages of legalization.11 7 The intervention of out-of-
state activists was a crucial factor in the passage of the
amendments in all three states.11 8 The availability of direct
democracy as a tool for state constitutional change was
equally crucial in advancing the legalization aims.
From a federalism perspective, the enshrinement of
marijuana as a protected drug in state constitutions sets up a
face-to-face conflict with federal law. The Federal Controlled
Substances Act's placement of marijuana among the most
dangerous drugs subject to regulation (with the most severe
penalties attached) remains unrepealed.11 9  The U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly and emphatically upheld
Congress's right to maintain its criminalization of
marijuana,1 20 a position consistently applied by the lower
courts. 1 2 1  And the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution makes crystal clear that valid federal law
sweeps aside any state law to the contrary.1 22
But instead of massive arrests and lengthy
imprisonment for the growers, transporters, and dealers in
the legalized states, the marijuana industry has succeeded in
framing public discourse as if the participants-or rather,
"conspirators," as federal law would have it-are engaged in
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. See id
119. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
120. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text
121. See, e.g., United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1010, 1012 (E.D. Cal.
2015) (rejecting a challenge to the CSA under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Tenth Amendment); Jenkins v. Micks, No. 1:14-CV-3522 (NJV), 2014 WL 6241217, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) (rejecting a challenge to the CSA under the Due Process
Clause); Wilson v. Holder, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1122-25 (D. Nev. 2014) (rejecting a
challenge to the CSA under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the
Equal Protection Clause); Krumm v. Holder, No. CIV 08-1056 JB/WDS, 2009 WL
1563381, at *13 (D.N.M. May 27, 2009) (rejecting a challenge to the CSA for failure to
follow the CSA's rescheduling of controlled substances procedures); Kuromiya v.
United States, 37 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (rejecting a challenge to the CSA
under the First (privacy), Ninth, and Tenth Amendments; the Equal Protection Clause;
and the Commerce Clause).
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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lawful conduct and, if anything, are burdened by the
bureaucratic red tape imposed by federal over-regulation.1 23
From the federal perspective, nothing has changed about the
criminal status of marijuana as a matter of law.124 So why
are law enforcement officials not crushing the marijuana
industry across the country, including in states that purport
to have legalized it?
The explanation demonstrates just how powerful state
constitutional law can be as a space for contesting national
values and for creating law on the ground that can then
influence other states and the national government. First,
and most importantly, the federal government cannot
compel state and local police to enforce the federal criminal
statute, thanks to the Court's 1997 case of Printz v. United
States, which established the "anti-commandeering"
principle.1 25 With local police bound by their state laws
prohibiting the prosecution of marijuana users, any effort to
enforce the Controlled Substances Act would have to come
from federal officers. Not only would nationwide
enforcement of anti-marijuana laws pose a tremendous
fiscal burden on the Justice Department and other anti-drug
agencies, it would present a politically distasteful scenario of
regular federal patrols and raids in communities across the
country accustomed to their primary policing services
coming from local officials.
Second, for political reasons, the Justice Department
decided to exercise prosecutorial discretion to refrain from
pursuing participants in the marijuana industry in states
with their own regulatory systems, even if those systems
make marijuana widely available to consumers.126 The basis
for this policy is not constitutional interpretation, not a
123. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, As Marijuana Sales Grow, Start-Ups Step In for
Wary Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/
business/dealbook/as-marijuana-sales-grow-start-ups-step-in-for-wary-
banks.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/684K-X5N6] (characterizing the inability of
marijuana growers and dispensaries to use the federal banking system as a business
inconvenience overcome by start-up financial enterprises in the short term and
making banks "comfortable" with the "compliance issues" in the long term).
124. See GARVEY &YEH, supra note 113.
125. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
126. Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
justice, to U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013).
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statute, not a regulation, and not even an executive order,
but a mere "guidance" memo from the deputy attorney
general to all federal prosecutors. 127  The president or
attorney general could have a sudden change of heart and
revoke this guidance with the snap of a finger, but marijuana
industry participants seem completely confident that they
are safe from the confiscation of their investments and harsh
federal prison sentences for themselves and their
employees. 128
In part, this confidence may stem from a belief among
participants that the existence of safe, functioning marijuana
markets in American states without evidence of the parade
of horribles frequently projected onto legalization will stand
as a powerful persuasive device against federal intervention.
The state constitutional protection of marijuana in those
states creates a literal physical space where the otherwise-
untested assumptions about the evils of marijuana can be
confronted and disproved. In the face of that reality, anti-
marijuana arguments lose their bite. Without geographic
federalism, this would not be possible.
V. CONCLUSION
The three movements described in this brief essay
employed shifting strategies to achieve their goals
nationwide, and they are each in different stages of reaching
success. The gun rights movement has followed what is
perhaps the most conventional or predictable path: after
failing to employ state constitutions effectively to establish
rights (particularly in perceived tension with federal
criminal law), moving on to win state-by-state victories, and
a few federal legislative advances, on public policy grounds,
then gradually shifting the rhetoric over time to one of
rights, and then winning vindication for those rights in
federal court under the federal Constitution. The movement
for marriage equality started with rights rhetoric and never
127. Id.
128. Tim Mullaney, As Marijuana Goes Legit, Investors Rush In, USA TODAY (Apr.
8, 2013, 2:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/04/07
/medical-marijuana-industry-growing-billion-dollar-business/2018759/ [http://per
ma.cc/7PB7-CZ4 U].
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wavered; litigation began (prematurely, in retrospect) in
federal courts at a time when federal courts were perceived
as most likely to protect civil rights, but then retreated and
retrenched in state courts under state constitutions. After
establishing marriage equality on the ground in states
covering a sufficient percentage of the American population,
the movement proceeded toward litigation on related issues
in federal court before those victories cascaded into full,
nationwide success. The as-yet least successful of the three
movements, marijuana legalization, began (like the other
movements) at the fringes of American politics and law.
Advocates met early success in the normally fruitful effort to
cast the issue as one of rights through linking marijuana use
to bodily autonomy in the healthcare context. But after a
setback in that approach, the movement quickly
reconfigured to position marijuana legalization as a public
policy issue, piggybacking on the relatively sudden public
interest in over-incarceration and criminal justice reform.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, shifting from a rights-
based rhetoric to a majoritarian public policy rhetoric
yielded astonishing results for the movement. Several states
amended their state constitutions to protect marijuana use,
and many more states saw political conversations about
legalization that would hardly have been imaginable just
thirty years ago.
Together, the stories of these movements show the
value of state constitutions to national law reform. State
constitutions can offer a testing ground, where arguments
framed as non-instrumentalist rights can achieve success
over limited geographical space; that space then serves as a
living counterpoint to parade-of-horribles arguments
against the asserted rights. The marriage-equality
movement proves this value of state constitutions. State
constitutions can also provide protection, contrary to what
formal law suggests, for rights above a federal ceiling. Even
if the federal government criminalizes conduct like gun
ownership or marijuana use, legal and political success at
the state level can eviscerate federal law enforcement efforts
and carve out states where the federally-disapproved policy
operates as the law in effect. State constitutionalism, and
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not just federalism, helps to effectuate this strategy by
providing advocates with the structure-of-government
features that make adoption of the law reforms possible,
such as state constitutionally created popular democracy or
state constitutional recognition (or suppression) of
municipal home rule. These constitutional devices make
legal change within the states both easier to accomplish and
more symbolically powerful, helping to make possible
resistance to federal law. State constitutions also create
legal space for advocates to shift between policy-driven and
rights-driven arguments, according to whichever wins.
When the marijuana and gun movements met dead ends
with their rights arguments under state constitutions, they
shifted to policy arguments. When those arguments began
to succeed, the movements could return to
constitutionalizing their gains-at the federal level for guns,
and in the state constitutions for marijuana. And ultimately,
the consistent and proven advantage of national networks to
inspire and support intrastate constitutional change helps to
draw activists from across the country together, to perceive
their seemingly disparate challenges as mutually influential
and connected. Paradoxically, in this sense, state
constitutionalism bolsters nationwide civic republicanism
and strengthens national unity.
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